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I

n recent years record oil prices, long-term concerns about fossil fuel supplies (particularly oil), and worries about the contributions of fossil fuels
to the accumulation of greenhouse gases such as carbon and methane have
helped revive interest in nuclear energy production. 1 Indeed, it has become
commonplace to advocate renewed investment in nuclear energy production
in the United States. There has been, however, little consideration as to what a
global turn to nuclear energy on an enlarged scale would actually entail, let
alone the security implications of such.
This article’s concern, accordingly, is with what a globally expanded
use of nuclear energy would mean for nuclear proliferation specifically (as
opposed to the issues of nuclear waste disposal or the risk of catastrophic accident, which also merit serious consideration), and this topic as it centers on
state actors (rather than nonstate actors such as terrorist groups). In doing so it
will, first, examine what an enlarged use of nuclear energy would look like;
second, what risks such a changed volume and distribution of nuclear energy
production might entail; and third, what the options are for ameliorating those
risks.

Expanding Nuclear Energy Use
A large-scale expansion of nuclear energy production would affect
not only its sheer volume, but the distribution of such production around the
world, an issue which has rarely drawn comment. These two matters are discussed below.
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The Scale of Nuclear Energy Production, Present and Future
There are currently some 440 nuclear reactors operating worldwide,
which as of 2006 produced 2,660 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity every
year.2 This comes to roughly 16 percent of global electricity consumption,
and five percent of the world’s total energy consumption.
Significant as this is, it leaves enormous room for growth not only
given today’s overall portfolio, but the economic expansion anticipated in the
coming decades. The World Bank recently estimated world gross domestic
product (GDP) would grow to $140 trillion by mid-century, a 160 percent
rise.3 Such a growth rate would significantly outpace any previous improvement in energy efficiency (the trend having been about ten percent a decade
since 1970). Even assuming recently observed rates of progress hold, this will
translate into an 80 percent increase in energy consumption.4
For nuclear energy to simply keep its position in the world’s energy
portfolio, production equivalent to 800 of today’s reactors would be needed.
The very reason, however, for much of the interest in nuclear energy is concern about the scarcity of fossil fuels, particularly oil, so it can be expected
that nuclear energy will be called on to play a greater role than it has to
date—at the very least, generating a larger share of the electricity the world
uses. France currently gets 77 percent of its electricity through this medium.
Were the entire world to follow a similar path, it would mean more than a quadrupling of output, with more than 2,000 reactors required to meet current
needs, and between 3,000 and 4,000 reactors plausibly online by 2050. Were
nuclear energy to become more important in areas where it has previously
been marginalized, such as transportation—for instance, by powering fleets
of electric vehicles or large-scale hydrogen fuel production—then the demand could rise even beyond current expectations, with one observer estimating that simply to compensate for an absence in fossil fuel production
(rather than absolute decreases), some 5,000 to 6,000 reactors would be required by mid-century. 5
Global Distribution of Nuclear Energy Production
It is rarely noted that the vast majority of the nuclear production facilities currently operating in the world are concentrated in a handful of in-
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dustrialized nations. Nearly half (218) are in just three countries—the United
States (104), France (59), and Japan (55). Russia (which has 31 facilities), the
United Kingdom (23), South Korea (20), Germany (18), Canada (17), and
Ukraine (15), with another 124 reactors between them, account for another 28
percent of the total.
This puts three-fourths of the world’s reactors, and 83 percent of its
electricity production from nuclear energy, in nine countries with just 46 percent of the world’s GDP, and 48 percent of its electrical production and consumption. 6 Another 47 reactors, and ten percent of capacity, are concentrated
in just seven more countries—Sweden, Spain, Belgium, Taiwan, Switzerland, Czech Republic, and Slovakia, accounting for 16 nations controlling 93
percent of the world’s nuclear-generated electricity. 7 By contrast there are no
such plants in operation in the Middle East or Australasia as of this writing.
On the entire African continent, there are only the two plants operating in
South Africa, and there are just six in all of Latin America and the Caribbean,
with two each in Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina.
It is inconceivable that anything like this distribution will continue in
a world turning heavily to nuclear energy, a fact that has already laid the foundation for a broadening of production and use in East and South Asia.8 We
should also expect a large-scale, rapid establishment of nuclear energy production in areas where it has been virtually absent, for example, the Middle East,
sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America. To approximate France’s current level
of nuclear energy reliance, for instance, Iran alone would require roughly 18
operational reactors; Saudi Arabia, 20. More extensive substitution of nuclear
energy for other sources of power, or future economic expansion (such as described above), will require a commensurate growth in the number of reactors. 9
All of this may sound abstract, but moves in this direction are already well under way. Some 40 developing nations have expressed interest in
starting nuclear energy programs, and many have moved beyond vague statements of intentions. 10 The United Arab Emirates, for instance, has already
struck a deal for two reactors, the only one of 11 nations in this region (thus
far) to have announced such plans. 11

Assessing the Danger
As outlined above, a future in which the world as a whole turned to
nuclear energy will mean not just an expansion of nuclear energy production,
but substantial changes in production impacting mainland Asia, Africa, and
Latin America. An assessment of the associated proliferation risk involved
devolves basically into an examination of two dimensions, capabilities and
intentions—what widened nuclear energy use will mean for the access of
these states to nuclear weapons technology; and the impact that this new envi38
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“For nuclear energy to simply keep its position
in the world’s energy portfolio, production
equivalent to 800 of today’s reactors
would be needed.”

ronment will have on a government’s motivation to actually use that access to
produce nuclear weaponry.
Technological Access
The increase in nuclear energy production described above will
mean greater production, trading, and consumption of the fissile materials
and other technologies that are part of the nuclear fuel cycle. The specifics
differ according to reactor type, but every reactor uses uranium in the production of its fuel and produces plutonium in its waste, extractable in the fuel reprocessing procedure, and in such a manner that every type of reactor poses a
measure of proliferation risk.12 Gas-cooled and heavy-water reactors use natural uranium as fuel, but are ideal for producing weapons-grade plutonium.
“Fast-neutron” reactors use fissile material (such as highly enriched uranium
or plutonium) at the very start of their fuel cycle, and Fast Breeder Reactors in
particular produce more fissile material than they consume.
Even Light Water Reactors (LWRs), which have been described as
“proliferation-resistant” (two of which were provided to North Korea under
the Agreed Framework), are no exception.13 They use low-enriched uranium,
which is not useful for making weapons, but which is produced in the same enrichment process used to manufacture weapons. Additionally, low-enriched
uranium can be seen as halfway to weapons grade, since it can be more rapidly
enriched to the needed level than stock natural uranium. At the same time,
while these reactors produce relatively smaller quantities of lower quality plutonium than other types, it has been estimated that a 1,000-megawatt LWR can
still generate enough “weapons-usable” plutonium for up to 50 bombs a year.14
The response on the part of those seeking to limit proliferation has,
accordingly, been to encourage as many nuclear energy users as possible not
to develop the entire fuel cycle; that is, to forgo building up their own fuel enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. Instead, it is proposed that they buy
fuel and reprocessing services on the world market, as proposed in the Global
Nuclear Energy Partnership of February 2006.
Augumn 2008
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There are, however, widespread doubts about the initiative’s likely
cost and effectiveness, concerns articulated in a letter signed by a number of
control organizations, including the Federation of American Scientists, the
Union of Concerned Scientists, and the Arms Control Association. 15 Their
objections, however, fail to include one important point—that states have
been partly dissuaded from developing the full nuclear fuel cycle for economic reasons, a fact that may not remain operative in any massive expansion
of nuclear energy use.
Simply put, it is cheaper for a small nuclear program to buy nuclear
fuel on the world market than to build and operate the facilities required to enrich uranium domestically. This has resulted in only eight of some 30 nuclear
energy producers actually engaging in enrichment on an industrial scale.16 The
same is true for fuel reprocessing facilities, especially given the relatively low
cost of newly mined uranium. Accordingly, only a handful of states (Britain,
France, Russia, Japan, and India) actually practice civil reprocessing.17
Any significant growth in nuclear energy production would change
those economics. Many of today’s “small” programs would become equal in
size to those now considered large-scale, and for that reason their investments
in enrichment and reprocessing less impractical. Additionally, with more
programs large and small operational, there would be a larger, more lucrative
market for fuel production and fuel recycling services; the latter would in all
likelihood grow more attractive as enlarged uranium consumption tightens
supplies and drives up prices. (Indeed, as the situation currently stands, many
uranium exporters not regarded as likely proliferators—including Australia
and Canada—are interested in enrichment technology because enriching
their uranium before export would increase profitability.)18 Certainly if uranium prices were to rise, there would be more interest in Fast Breeder Reactors, which one analyst suggests can extract more than 60 times as much
energy per ton of mined ore as a “conventional” nuclear plant when operated
in a closed circuit with thermal reactors and reprocessing facilities. 19
In short, the economic incentives for states to refrain from developing
the full nuclear fuel cycle will almost certainly weaken, while the particularly
worrisome fast-neutron reactors will become more attractive. At the same
time, the heightened dependence on nuclear energy, and the experience of energy scarcity, will continue to reinforce the search for “energy independence”
and “energy security,” contributing to the pressure that the nonproliferation regime is already experiencing, as the result of being a “ratifier” of unequal access to nuclear technology. 20 In any event, such changes enormously increase
the already substantial burden of monitoring and securing the storage and
movement of the supplies associated with nuclear power generation, not to
mention the political costs of maintaining the regime. 21
40
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“Some 40 developing nations have already
expressed interest in starting nuclear
energy programs. . .”

Motivation
As outlined previously, any plausible combination of political arrangements and technological innovations is likely to have uneven results.
Determined states are likely to find it easier to acquire the means for producing fissile material, which raises the other key dimension of the issue—the
motivation for acquiring these weapons in the first place.
Long-established research strongly indicates that the motivation to
build nuclear weapons is more of a factor than simply achieving the technological capacity.22 Indeed, it is due to this excessive focus on capacity that earlier predictions about the speed and the extent of nuclear proliferation (which
projected 25 to 50 nuclear-weapon states by the year 2000) proved wrong. 23
The relative ease with which the weapons might be built is proof of this; a program to develop a minimal capability from scratch could cost as little as $500
million, less than the price of a modern warship.24
In short, were capacity the only issue, there would be far more nuclear powers in the world, though of course access to the means cannot be
ruled out as a factor in decisionmaking. When much of the infrastructure for
developing a nuclear arsenal is already in place, as may be the case in several
advanced countries, the decision to do so entails lower costs; and given the
speed with which these programs can be initiated, the nations in question are
also less susceptible to preventative action than countries starting from
scratch.25 A particular danger is that having such facilities in place provides
them with the option of diverting material from the fuel cycle for covert
weapon programs.26
The rationale driving the shift to nuclear energy in the first place (energy and climate stress) will increasingly translate into greater motivation on
the part of some actors to pursue a nuclear capability. Broad economic disruption is nearly certain as the result of the tightening of oil supplies and the climate changes this scenario anticipates. Politically, this may translate into
changes in the distribution of international power depending on individual
states’ability to cope (as with wealthier nations, or ones with energy-efficient
economies), or even profit from these conditions (for instance, oil exporters);
Augumn 2008
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while the most vulnerable states may collapse, creating even greater problems for the international community (havens for crime, terrorism, or refugee
flows).27 Intensified conflict over territory and waters rich in energy and other
resources will become increasingly likely.
Alliances, trading relationships, and other arrangements will be in flux,
and when combined with the associated anxiety and vulnerability may exacerbate a desire on the part of certain states to minimize their vulnerability. A goal
which nuclear weapons have long been viewed as a cheap way of achieving. The
“nuclearization” of a single state can induce a chain reaction across a region. The
nuclearization of China spurred India and in turn Pakistan to follow suit, and the
Argentinean and Brazilian nuclear programs fed off one another. Today the possibility that a nuclear North Korea may lead South Korea or Japan to acquire nuclear weapons is often discussed.28 In the Middle East there are signs that Saudi
Arabia is reviewing its nuclear options, and a nuclear-armed Iran may encourage
the Saudis and others in the region to continue down this path.29
With nuclear technology more widely available these actions can be
taken much more rapidly and at less cost. Those pursuing this course of action
will find it a simple matter to amass large stockpiles of nuclear weapons. It is
also worth noting that even were the development of actual nuclear weapons
to remain a rarity, “virtual arsenals” could be more common, leaving the nuclear weapons status of a longer list of countries uncertain, in many cases deliberately so, with a detrimental impact on the security environment. 30

Possible Responses
It would be a mistake to focus excessively on any one track for ameliorating the risk of proliferation. When all is said and done, the current monitoring mechanisms will remain, and so will the maintenance of a stable security
environment. Individual cases will require tailored solutions. Nonetheless, the
spread of nuclear energy production means a significantly enlarged number of
countries will have access to the full nuclear fuel cycle. There are then two primary ways to ameliorate the associated threats. One is to seek methods of nuclear energy production that are inherently proliferation-proof, as may be the
case with “Generation IV” nuclear reactors. The other is to reduce the need for
nuclear energy production, by making overall energy consumption more efficient, and by increasing production from alternative, nonfossil fuel sources.
New Reactor Designs
Some experts argue that the next-generation (Generation IV) reactor
designs will reduce the proliferation risks associated with nuclear energy production. Advocates of next-generation fast-neutron reactors argue that they
could provide more efficient energy production. This would enable them to re42
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cover up to 99 percent of the energy from their fuel, allowing them to use
smaller quantities and a greater variety of fuel types, including natural uranium
and possibly even depleted uranium.31 They would also generate less waste
(perhaps only one percent), containing only trace amounts of the transuranics
needed for weapons manufacture, than other reactors of similar capacity.32 This
would permit “pyroprocessing,” a different, possibly cheaper, approach to
reprocessing fuel that is less suitable for weapons manufacture.33 Finally, these
different procedures will permit onsite fuel fabrication, fuel recycling, and
waste processing, something current reactor fuel cycles do not allow, reducing
the transportation and security problems.
While appearing to be a panacea for many of nuclear power’s problems, these designs will not be commercially viable until at least 2030. Additionally, despite their obvious advantages, pressuring states to adopt reactors
of any given type raises many of the same political issues as the schemes
associated with restricting a potential proliferator’s access to nuclear fuel—
especially given the fact that established nuclear powers, based on their intention of retaining their current nuclear arsenals, are almost certain to continue
operating their existing reactors.
Improved Energy Efficiency
As previously noted, a trend toward more efficient energy use has
been evident in recent decades. Running at roughly ten percent a decade, this
move to greater energy efficiency is inadequate to compensate for the increases in economic growth. It has, however, been a factor in reducing the rate
of energy consumption.
There are some real reasons for concern that this trend will not be
sustainable. In fact, it may be that the law of diminishing returns has already
set in. Relatively efficient energy nations, for example Italy and Japan, have
since the 1980s seen the rate of improvement in their energy efficiency stagnate.34 It is the less-efficient states such as the United States and Britain that
have witnessed the most significant gains, enabling Britain to catch up to the
more efficient nations.35
The gains of even the most inefficient of the advanced countries
were generally dwarfed by those of less-developed states, particularly those
classed as “lower middle income” economies (per-capita GDPs of $906 to
$3,595 a year). According to World Bank statistics, the energy demands of
these economies dropped by half in the period 1990 to 2003 (compared with a
ten percent reduction for the high-income countries). 36
As more states move beyond current income and efficiency levels, it
stands to reason that future gains will be even less dramatic. This is not to say,
however, that gains beyond the current levels are impossible, or strictly hypoAugumn 2008
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“It is rarely noted that the vast majority of
the nuclear production facilities currently
operating in the world are concentrated
in a handful of industrialized nations.”

thetical, as Denmark, Ireland, and Hong Kong have more than adequately
demonstrated.37 It is only fair to note that the decade of the 1990s was a period
of relatively cheap energy, and that future energy markets and greater political pressure to pursue ecologically sound policies will encourage greater efforts at efficiency in this arena. It may also be possible for revolutionary
technologies to account for unforeseen gains, permitting advances in energy
efficiency to outpace economic growth. In the scenario sketched in the “Factor Four” study by Ernst von Weizacker, et al., the high projection for global
economic growth mentioned previously—160 percent—might be realized
with even less energy than the world economy consumes today.38
Alternative Energy Sources
There is a very real possibility that what energy the world does consume may be increasingly derived from alternatives to both fossil fuels and
nuclear energy. The rapidly growing array of renewable sources is only beginning to be exploited.
At present, wind appears to be the renewable energy resource with
the greatest potential, given the current state of the technology. As is often
noted, the United States could meet its entire energy needs with current power
generation technology simply by harnessing the wind energy of the Dakotas.39 Affluent, densely populated Denmark, the world leader in wind energy
when production is measured on a per-capita basis, gets nearly 25 percent of
its electricity from wind.40 Innovations such as windmills based on floating
platforms may revolutionize the field with their mobility, flexibility, and potential for tapping high-speed winds at sea, as might the still more radical
“flying windmills.”41
Solar energy is also an ever-increasing source. Its more efficient size
and comparatively easy set-up is an asset, and when incorporated into energyefficient buildings, can actually turn them into net energy producers. 42 There
are also a number of ideas related to large-scale electricity production from
photovoltaics. One of the more well-known is a recent plan to build solar
44
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power stations in North Africa, transmitting the electricity generated to Europe via underwater cable.43
While long overlooked due mainly to high capital costs, tidal energy
holds potential that is comparable to wind. One projection even indicates that
Great Britain could meet a fifth of its current energy needs through the use of
tidal technology.44 Biofuels (e.g., ethanol) production also has potential as a
substitute for fossil fuels, though the degree to which it can succeed depends
heavily on the particular crops and agricultural techniques used to produce
them.45 These are qualitatively as well as quantitatively notable solutions, because they incorporate the prospect of reducing transportation burdens on
electrical power generation. There are other developing technologies that
hold similar possibilities, such as the biological techniques for generating hydrogen and other fuels. 46

Conclusion
The worst-case scenario is one in which the global throughput of the
nuclear fuel cycle is enlarged by an order of magnitude or more, and dispersed
globally, at a moment of rising economic, ecological, and political strain.
While plausible, this scenario is not inevitable. Ultimately, the risk of nuclear
proliferation during the twenty-first century will have as much to do with how
the world copes with the problems posed by scarcity and the ecological impact of fossil fuels. Were nuclear energy used to substantially compensate for
the shortfall in oil and other fossil fuels, it holds the possibility for taxing the
current nonproliferation regime’s surveillance and enforcement mechanisms
beyond their breaking point. Consequently, every effort should be made to
curtail the need to increase nuclear energy production, at least until many of
the problems associated with it are significantly ameliorated (as Generation
IV reactors may do).
In the meantime we should focus our efforts on investment in improving energy efficiency and increasing energy production from nonnuclear, as
well as nonfossil, fuel sources. This process is already under way, but history
has shown that if it is to be successful, rapid, large-scale development requires
maximum government support, not only on the domestic front, but also internationally.47
This is not to say there may not be a legitimate requirement to increase the production of nuclear energy, as would certainly be true if fossil
fuel production were to drop more rapidly than we could compensate for
with improved energy efficiency and production. Nor is this to say that more
conventional steps to secure nuclear energy production against proliferation need not be taken. Rather, what we should take away from this analysis
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is that it is best for all of mankind to minimize the expansion of nuclear
energy production during this century and to strengthen nonproliferation
regimes.
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